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THE INFLUENCE OF HONG KONG BANKING LAW 
ON BANKING REFORM IN THE PRC* 
DUNCAN ALFORD** 
 After the hand-over of Hong Kong by the United Kingdom to the 
People's Republic of China ("PRC") on June 30, 1997, some analysts 
were concerned that the PRC would slowly but steadily restrict the 
economic freedom that Hong Kong residents had enjoyed under British 
rule.  There was concern that the PRC would not follow the dictates of 
the Basic Law,1 the treaty between the PRC and the United Kingdom that 
is viewed as serving as Hong Kong's constitution.  Some commentators 
predicted that China would interfere with Hong Kong's economy and its 
legal system despite the protections of the Basic Law,2 which requires the 
maintenance of the capitalist system in Hong Kong until at least 2047.3 
 While the PRC has influenced policy in Hong Kong in several ways,4 
this Article argues that in the area of financial supervision, particularly 
bank supervision, the smaller Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
("SAR") has significantly influenced banking reform in the PRC rather 
than the reverse.  The PRC's implementation and development of bank 
supervisory standards that approach compliance with international 
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1  See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, reprinted in 29 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1519 (1990) 
[hereinafter Basic Law]. 
2 See Owen Fiss, Hong Kong Democracy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 493 (1998); 
Daniel R. Fung, Hong Kong—China Legal Synergy in the Run-up To and Beyond, 18 U. 
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 41 (1997); Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong Fears Unraveling of Rule 
of Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1997, at A1. 
3 See Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 5. 
4 In 2003, the PRC government advocated for the passage of a sedition law and later 
forced the resignation of the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee Hwa.  See 
Bad Luck and Bad Judgment, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at 22.  Contra 
Jimmy Cheung, I Can't Take the Strain Says Tung, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 
2005, at 3 (suggesting that Tung's resignation was due to his "ailing health"). 
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financial standards has been significantly influenced by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority ("HKMA"), Hong Kong's central bank, through both 
informal and formal contacts between HKMA officials and PRC bank 
supervisory officials. 
 Anne-Marie Slaughter has commented in several articles on the 
development of "transgovernmental regulatory networks,"5 defined as a 
series of ongoing contacts between government subunits that are not 
controlled by the policies set by the chief executive and his cabinet of 
advisors.6  Slaughter notes that financial regulators were among the first 
to create these networks.7  The interaction among the HKMA, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, and the People's Bank of China is an 
example of these regulatory networks at work and constitutes an 
important vehicle for introducing international financial standards into 
the developing financial system of the second largest economy in the 
world.8 
 This Article is divided into four parts:  (1) a brief analysis and 
description of the PRC banking system, (2) a short history of banking 
reform in the PRC, (3) an analysis and description of the influence of the 
HKMA and the Hong Kong financial sector generally on the PRC 
banking reform efforts, and finally, (4) an examination of the prospects 
of the continuation of the Hong Kong influence on PRC banking reform. 
I. PRC BANKING SECTOR 
 The PRC is heavily dependent on its banking sector for the provision 
of credit as bank loans are the primary source of credit in China.  The 
banking industry in China is a government dominated system that 
controls 80% of all financial assets of China.9  The remaining 20% of 
 
 
5  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information 
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1043 (2003) 
[hereinafter Slaughter, Global Government Networks]; See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The 
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001). 
6 See Slaughter, Global Government Networks, supra note 5, at 1045. 
7 Id. 
8
 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: China (Oct. 9, 2008), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2008) ("Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, China in 2007 
stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US . . . ."). 
9  See Fitch Ratings, The Chinese Banking System, at 3 (June 6, 2006), 
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financial assets consists of stocks and bonds, though principally stocks. 
 The institutions comprising the PRC banking system can be divided 
into five separate tiers:10 
(1) the Big Four state-operated commercial banks, 
(2) the policy banks, 
(3) joint stock commercial banks, 
(4) city commercial banks, and 
(5) credit cooperatives. 
The Big Four state-operated commercial banks–the Bank of China, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank 
and the Agricultural Bank of China–controlled 55% of all banking assets 
within China in 2005.11  The next tier consists of three policy banks, 
which are financial institutions designed to meet the policy objectives of 
the national government and the Chinese Communist Party.  The three 
policy banks controlled approximately 8% of banking assets in China.  
Twelve joint commercial banks in China comprise the third tier and 
control 16% of banking assets.  The more prominent commercial banks 
include the Bank of Communications12 and the Shenzhen Development 
Bank.  The 112 city commercial banks control 6% of China's banking 
assets.  The final tier consists of the credit cooperatives similar in 
function to credit unions in the United States.  The credit cooperatives 
include thousands of small operations located mainly in rural areas of 
China.  The cooperatives control approximately 9% of the banking assets 
in China.  Foreign-funded banks and the Postal Savings Bank control the 
remaining 6% of banking assets.13  Foreign banks have only recently 
been allowed to operate in China and then only pursuant to stringent 
regulations.14 
 In contrast, the Hong Kong banking system consists of three tiers–
licensed banks, restricted licensed banks, and deposit taking companies.15  
                                                                                                                       
 
http://www.fitchratings.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Fitch Ratings]. 
10 Id. at 3-4. 
11 Banking assets in China are primarily unsecured and secured loans with varying 
maturities.  In contrast, financial assets include both banking assets as well as equity and 
credit instruments outside the banking system. 
12 HSBC, the international bank with its main business office in Hong Kong, owns 
an equity interest in the Bank of Communications. 
13 See Fitch Ratings, supra note 9, at 4.  
14 See generally TONG XIAOHU, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN CHINA (2005). 
15 See BERRY F.C. HSU, LAWS OF BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE HONG KONG SAR 
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The Hong Kong banking system is dominated by three major financial 
institutions:  the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
("HSBC"), Standard Chartered Bank, and the Bank of China (Hong 
Kong).  The Hong Kong banking system is open to foreign banks that 
can comply with the banking regulatory standards of the HKMA. 
II.  A SHORT HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 
 In 1949 after the Communist Revolution in China, the Communist 
Party created the People's Bank of China ("PBOC").16  From 1949 until 
1979, China had a monolithic banking system with the PBOC serving as 
the sole depository institution and lender.17  In 1979, Deng Xiaoping 
began his reform of the economy, which included reform of the banking 
industry.18  In that same year the commercial operations, lending and 
deposit-taking functions, were separated into a division distinct from the 
central bank and supervisory operations of the PBOC.  With the creation 
of the three policy banks and the Big Four state-operated commercial 
banks in 1994, a new series of major reforms of the Chinese banking 
system began.  In 1995, the National People's Congress enacted the Law 
on the People's Bank of China19 which made the PBOC a true central 
bank and bank regulator.  During the same year, the Commercial 
Banking Law was enacted to set prudential supervisory standards for 
banks.20 
                                                                                                                       
 
(1998). 
16 See James R. Barth, Rob Koepp & Zhong Fei Zhou, Banking Reform in China: 
Cataloging the Nation's Financial Future (Feb. 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=548405 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) 
(providing a timeline at the end of the article succinctly describing key events in bank 
reform in the PRC). 
17 Id. at 16-17. 
18 See XIAOHU, supra note 14, at 15.  See also William I. Friedman, China's One 
Nation, Two-System Paradigm Extends Itself Beyond the Mainland's Borders to the 
Southern Provincial Government of Hong Kong, 11 TRANS. L. & POL. 1 (2001); Lawrence 
C. Wolken, The Restructuring of China's Banking System under the Economic Reforms 
1979-1989, COLUMBIA J. WORLD BUS. 53 (Spring/Summer 1990); Y.C. Richard Wong & 
M.L. Sonia Wong, Competition in China's Domestic Banking Industry, 21 CATO J. 19 
(2001). 
19  Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People’s Cong., effective Mar. 18, 1995), 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
20 Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks (promulgated by the 
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 In 1997, a financial crisis began in Thailand which then spread to 
other Asian nations.21  While China was insulated from the financial 
crisis to a certain degree because of the inconvertibility of its currency, 
the national government nevertheless became concerned about the 
performance of Chinese banks and began to focus on the large amount of 
nonperforming loans held by Chinese banks.  In 1998, due to the large 
amount of nonperforming loans, the PRC recapitalized the Big Four 
banks in the amount of U.S. $33 billion. 22   In that same year the 
securities, insurance, and banking supervisory structures were separated 
within the PBOC.23  To assist in the disposal of the large amount of non-
performing loans of the Big Four banks, four asset management 
companies were created, one for each of the Big Four banks.24  The 
nonperforming loans of the banks—in total valued at U.S. $170 billion—
were transferred to the respective asset management companies.25  
 In 2001, the PRC acceded to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization ("WTO").26  Under this treaty, the PRC 
agreed to allow foreign banks to open branches in major Chinese cities in 
stages, and foreign investment in Chinese financial institutions began in 
earnest.27  In 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission ("CBRC") 
                                                                                                                       
 
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), translated 
in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.).  See also Barth, supra note 16, at 
16. 
21 See generally MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS:  CAUSES, CURES 
AND SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS (1998). 
22 See Barth, supra note 16, at 10. 
23 Id. 
24 See infra EXHIBIT A, which describes the asset management companies.  See 
generally ALAN TANG, INSOLVENCY IN CHINA AND HONG KONG: A PRACTITIONER'S 
PERSPECTIVE 241-262 (2005). 
25 Fitch Ratings, supra note 9. 
26 Accession of China to WTO Agreement, Protocol on the Accession of the People's 
Republic of China of Nov. 10, 2001, World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on 
the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Annex, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), 
completed at the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Doha, Qatar, on Nov. 10, 2001. 
27 KPMG, MAINLAND CHINA BANKING SURVEY 17 (2006).  It was not until December 
11, 2006, however, that most restrictions on foreign bank operations within the PRC were 
lifted.  See Rules for Implementing the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
Administration of Foreign-Funded Banks, CBRC Chairman's Decree No. 6, Art. 12 
(2006). The major limitation is the high capital requirement for opening a branch.  See 
also Sundeep Tucker, Foreign Banks Line Up to Expand in China, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 
28, 2006, at 20. 
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was created.28  In that same year, there was additional recapitalization of 
the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank in the amount of 
U.S. $45 billion—U.S. $22.5 billion per bank—in preparation for these 
banks to be listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.29 
 With the entry of foreign-owned banks into the PRC as a result of 
accession to the WTO and the resulting relaxation of restrictions on 
foreign bank operations, Chinese banks would face increased 
competition.  The recapitalization of the Big Four state-owned banks was 
part of a long term strategy developed by the PRC government to 
strengthen the finances of these banks in preparation for this increased 
competition.30  With a stronger balance sheet, the Big Four could list 
equity shares and attract foreign investment.  Foreign investment would 
further strengthen the banks' balance sheets and attract needed bank 
management expertise from foreign bank investors. 
 Another part of this long-term strategy was the relaxation of bank 
regulations to allow for more flexible management of banks and to make 
Chinese banks more attractive to foreign investors. 31   In 2004, the 
National People's Congress amended the Law on the People's Bank of 
China and the Commercial Banking Law and liberalized interest rates 
charged on loans while maintaining regulated interest rates earned on 
deposit accounts.32  Also in 2004, the HSBC invested in the Bank of 
Communications, which was the largest equity investment in a Chinese 
bank since 1949.33 
 In 2005, the Bank of Communications and the China Construction 
Bank completed initial public offerings of their stock on the Hong Kong 
 
 
28 Banking Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004), translated 
in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
29 Barth, supra note 16, at 11. 
30 Id.  See also Chi Lo, Chinese Bank Report Card:  The Reform Road is Still Bumpy, 
so Forget Full RMB Convertibility Anytime Soon, 20 INT'L ECON. 52, 54 (2006). 
 31 Id. 
32 Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 18, 1995, amended Dec. 
27, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.); Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Commercial Banks (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l 
People's Cong., May 10, 1995, amended Dec. 27, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 
20, 2008) (P.R.C.).  See also Barth, supra note 16, at 17. 
33 HSBC to Pay $1.75 Billion for Stake in Chinese Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2004, 
at C4 [hearinafter HSBC to Pay]. 
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Stock Exchange.  In that same year, the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China was recapitalized by the national government in the amount of 
U.S. $50 billion.  In June 2006, the Bank of China completed its initial 
public offering on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Four months later in 
October 2006, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China completed 
its initial public offering on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock 
exchanges in the largest single stock offering ever in the world.34  Thus, 
by the end of 2006, three of the Big Four state-owned banks had 
implemented the long-term strategy of recapitalization and subsequent 
initial public offerings to attract foreign capital and foreign bank 
management expertise to enhance their competitiveness in the financial 
services market within China and internationally. 
 Currently, the PBOC and the CBRC regulate the banking industry in 
the PRC.35  The PBOC, led by Zhou Xiaochuan,36 regulates interest rates 
and sets monetary policy.  The CBRC, led by Liu Mingcheng, serves as 
the bank regulator and examiner and sets prudential supervisory 
standards. 37   The CBRC, organized into 15 different departments, 
maintains offices at the provincial, prefectural and county levels 
throughout the PRC.38  At the end of 2006, the CBRC employed 23,269 
people39 and, therefore, training employees in new supervisory laws and 
procedures is a complicated, time-consuming task.40 
 
 
34 INDUS. & COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2006); Keri 
Greiger, ICBC Makes Strong Debut in Hong Kong, Shanghai, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2006, 
at B5. 
35 ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA: COUNTRY REPORT 25 (2006).  The State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) monitors and regulates the holdings of 
foreign currency within the People's Bank of China. 
36 Brian Bremner, Banking on Reform in China, BUS. WK., Dec. 12, 2005. 
37 See China Banking Regulatory Comm'n, About the CBRC, available at 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/info/yjhjj/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) 
(enumerating areas of the CBRC's supervisory focus and maintaining a list of the CBRC's 
management). 
38  See Id.  See also China Banking Regulatory Commission Opens Up New 
Milestone, THE ASIAN BANKER, Dec. 15, 2003 (providing an overview of the CBRC at an 
early stage in its development). 
39 CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 104 (2006).  See also 
James T. Areddy, China Updates Financial Sector for Global Rivalry, WALL ST. J., June 2, 
2005, at A11. 
40 See generally Victor Shih, China's Uphill Battle for Stronger Banks, FAR E. ECON. 
REV. 37 (Nov. 2005). 
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III. HONG KONG INFLUENCE ON BANKING SUPERVISION IN THE PRC 
 Given the increasing integration of the economies of the People's 
Republic of China and Hong Kong, 41  this Article investigates the 
relationship between Hong Kong banking law and Chinese banking law.  
In particular, it explores the question of whether the more developed 
banking law of Hong Kong has influenced changes in Chinese banking 
law.  Based on my research,42 Hong Kong banking law has had minimal 
direct influence on the statutory law governing the PRC banking system.  
However, Hong Kong law and supervisory practice has significantly 
affected the implementation of banking law in China, through training 
programs held by the HKMA for PRC officials and the exchange of bank 
and official personnel between Hong Kong financial institutions and 
financial regulators with their counterparts in the PRC. 
 The Hong Kong influence on the People's Republic of China 
statutory banking law is not significant.  The PRC looked to several 
sources in reforming its banking law, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia.  Research for this Article involved 
examining and comparing selected banking laws in both the PRC and 
Hong Kong and found few textual similarities.43  Rather, the international 
financial standards developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and other informal networks of financial supervisors were 
significant influences on the implementation of PRC statutory law.44   
 In contrast to the limited influence on the PRC statutory banking law, 
the influence of Hong Kong banking law on the implementation of 
banking law and regulation in the PRC is significant.  There is a 
 
 
41 The Closer Economic Partnership Agreement between the PRC and Hong Kong 
SAR has increased investment and trade between both countries.  See An Agreement in 
Numbers, CHINA DAILY, June 29, 2007.  The recent approval of Hong Kong as a place of 
investment for PRC investors under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) 
program will further increase investment by mainland Chinese investors in Hong Kong.  
See CICC Strategy Report for the Two Quarters, CHINA KNOWLEDGE NEWSWIRE, June 27, 
2007. 
42 In addition to my documentary research, I conducted field interviews in Hong 
Kong SAR during May and June 2006. 
 43 See infra EXHIBIT B, which lists the laws of the PRC and the Hong Kong SAR 
that were examined and compared. 
44 Liu Mingkang, Chairman, China Banking Regulatory Comm'n, Luncheon remarks 
at the American Chambers of Commerce; CBRC's Approach to Banking Sector Reform 
and Opening to the Outside World, (Oct. 15, 2004) republished in 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FOREIGN BANKS IN CHINA (Sept. 2005). 
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significant exchange of official personnel between Hong Kong financial 
regulators and their counterparts in the PRC.  For example, Laura Cha, 
who was the deputy chair of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission from 1998 until 2001, became the Vice-Chair of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission from 2001 through 2004.45  Anthony 
Neoh, a former chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission, became a chief adviser to the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission for several years beginning in 1998. 46   He is now an 
independent director on the board of the Bank of China.  Anthony Leung, 
a former financial Secretary of the Hong Kong SAR, served as a 
consultant to the CBRC and as an independent director of the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China. 47   Both the Securities and Futures 
Commission, Hong Kong's securities regulator, and the HKMA provide 
secondment opportunities for PRC regulators.48  Andrew Sheng, former 
Chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission from 
1998-2005 and former Deputy Chief Executive of the HKMA from 
1993-1998, serves as the Chief Advisor to the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission.49 
 Financial institutions in China are also exchanging bank personnel 
with foreign bank investors.  In 2004, HSBC purchased 19.9% of the 
equity of the Bank of Communications for U.S. $1.75 billion.50  HSBC 
and Bank of Communications regularly exchange personnel at all 
levels.51  Dickey Peter Yip, a former HSBC bank official, is now the 
 
 
45 Enoch Yiu, Cha Breaks New Ground at CSRC, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 
14, 2001, at Business 1. 
46 Enoch Yiu, CSRC Framework to Keep Mainland Nuances in Mind, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at Business 2. 
47 Ben Kwok, Lai See—Global Giant WPP Set to Pounce on Enfant Terrible of 
Local PR Scene, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 3, 2005, at Business 12; INDUS. & 
COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2006). 
48 Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") from Joseph Yam, Chief Executive, 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, with the China Banking Regulatory Commission (Aug. 
28, 2003) at 3.  This document is Chief Executive Yam's explanation of the MOU, not the 
actual text.  The text of MOU's among central banks and financial regulators are 
generally kept confidential.  SFC Appoints China Affairs Senior VP, CHINA KNOWLEDGE 
PRESS, May 21, 2007. 
49 Enoch Yiu, SFC Chief Gets a New Hat but No Takers Yet for Non-Exec Chairman, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 2006, at Business 4; CHINA BANKING 
REGULATORY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2006). 
50 See HSBC to Pay, supra note 33.  
51 See HSBC Puts Partnership into Practice, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1, 2006, at Banking 
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Vice-Governor of the Bank of Communications in China.52  Additionally, 
HSBC is sending 80 to 100 Bank of Communications officers to its 
training program at HSBC's training center in the United Kingdom.53  
China Construction Bank officials have attended training programs 
conducted by the Bank of America, which invested U.S. $2.5 billion in 
the China Construction Bank in 2004.54  Likewise, other foreign bank 
investors are offering training opportunities for nationals from Chinese 
banks.55 
 While personnel exchanges are increasing, the ownership limits on 
foreign banks under Chinese banking law hinder extensive personnel 
exchanges.  A foreign financial institution is limited to owning a 
maximum of 20% of the equity of a Chinese financial institution.  The 
maximum limit of all foreign equity ownership of a Chinese financial 
institution is 25%.56  Under current PRC law, foreign banks will always 
remain a minority owner, which thus significantly limits the foreign 
bank's influence on operations of the Chinese bank, including exchanges 
of personnel with the investor bank.57 
 Contacts and interaction among Hong Kong and PRC bank 
supervisory personnel have intensified since the 2003 creation of the 
CBRC, a separate PRC government agency focusing solely on bank 
supervision, and these contacts have been the main vehicle for the 
positive influence of Hong Kong banking law on PRC bank 
                                                                                                                       
 
1 (explaining how the banks have been exchanging staff at all levels). 
52  Karina Robinson, Hong Kong: Stepping Stone into China—Karina Robinson 
Reports From Hong Kong On The Incorporated Banks' Mainland China Strategies, THE 
BANKER, Nov. 1, 2005. 
53  Kevin Hamlin, Connected at the Chip:  HSBC and BoCom, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR, Feb. 8, 2007, at 7. 
54 See KPMG, supra note 27, at 17. 
55 Staff Turnover Hinders Foreign Banks in China, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, May 12, 
2007, at 15. 
56 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA:  COUNTRY FINANCE 13-14 (2005). 
57 While limiting foreign bank ownership of Chinese banks, the CBRC wishes to 
encourage foreign bank influence on Chinese banks in particular areas: foreign banks 
bring banking expertise that does not otherwise exist in Chinese banks. In particular, 
foreign bank personnel are expected to create a credit culture in the bank and to improve 
internal risk management systems. The CBRC also expects foreign banks to improve 
corporate governance of Chinese banks, to encourage further investments in technology, 
and to gain international market approval of Chinese banks by their presence.  See 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FOREIGN BANKS IN CHINA 85-86 (2007). 
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supervision. 58   The CBRC wants to continue to cooperate with the 
HKMA and has made improving and deepening cooperation with the 
HKMA a policy priority, 59  with the ultimate goal of improving the 
professionalism and international standing of the CBRC.60  Similarly, the 
HKMA and the Chief Executive of Hong Kong view cooperation with 
the CBRC and other financial regulators in the PRC as a way to improve 
financial stability in the PRC and indirectly in Hong Kong. 61   The 
HKMA created a China Division in late 2004 in recognition of the PRC's 
importance to the financial sector in Hong Kong.62  One objective of the 
China Division is to coordinate with the PRC on bank supervisory 
matters.  In addition, in 2006, the HKMA announced a "1-3-5 strategy" 
to consolidate Hong Kong's position as the international financial center 
in China. 63   The 1-3-5 strategy or "1-3-5 financial development 
blueprint" is a proposal for closer financial cooperation between Hong 
Kong and the PRC. 64   A prerequisite for this strategy is continuing 
cooperation between regulatory authorities in Hong Kong and the PRC.65 
 Prior to 2003 when the CBRC was created, the HKMA provided 
training to officials of the PBOC.  Currently, the HKMA provides 
 
 
58 See infra EXHIBIT C. 
59 Press Release, China Banking Regulatory Comm'n, The CBRC Chairman Liu 
Mingkang held a meeting with Donald Tsang, the Chief Executive of the H.K. Special 
Admin. Region (Dec. 28, 2006). 
60
 CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMM'N, REPORT ON THE OPENING-UP OF THE 
CHINESE BANKING SECTOR (Jan. 25, 2007), republished in PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
FOREIGN BANKS IN CHINA 77 (2007). 
61 China Banking Regulatory Comm'n Press Release, supra, note 59. 
62 William Ryback, Issues of Risk-based Supervision in Hong Kong 213 (Bank of 
Int'l Settlements, BIS Papers No. 28, 2006). 
63 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 87 (2006); see also Joseph Yam, Chief 
Executive of H.K. Monetary Authority, A Financial Development Strategy for Hong 
Kong (Mar. 23 2006), translated in H.K. MONETARY AUTH., H.K. MONETARY AUTH. Q. 
BULL. 27, 30 (June 2006) (proposing a "five-pronged strategy" he described as a "win-
win" strategy for both Hong Kong and the Mainland). 
64  H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 89 (2006).  This blueprint aims to 
position Hong Kong as a globally significant "international financial centre" by 
establishing "a complementary, cooperative and interactive relationship between the 
financial systems of Hong Kong and the Mainland," and articulates five areas that can act 
as a catalyst.  Id. at 89-90. 
65 Id. at 87; CENT. POL'Y UNIT, SUMMARY OF VIEWS EXPRESSED AT FOCUS GROUP 
DISCUSSION ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, at 4 (Sept. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/info/econ_summit/eng/pdf/summary_financial_e.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2008) (proceedings of the Economic Summit on China's 11th Five Year Plan and 
the Development of Hong Kong). 
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extensive training opportunities for regulatory officials from the PBOC 
and the CBRC.66  The number of Chinese officials attending training 
conducted by the HKMA has increased from 272 in eight programs in 
2002,67 to 1,401 in sixteen programs in 2007.68 
 Two types of training programs are offered to participating PRC 
officials:  (1) structured programs that typically last two weeks with a 
separate topic covered each day, and (2) specialized programs which last 
two to three days.  The topics covered in the structured training include 
risk-based supervision, corporate governance, general bank management, 
loan classification, electronic banking, anti-money laundering laws and 
procedures, connected lending, and an overview of Basel II capital 
regulation.69   The topics of the specialized programs include vehicle 
finance and real estate lending, among others. 
 Hong Kong has a number of cultural advantages in providing this 
training to PRC officials.  First, training can be conducted in Mandarin 
Chinese, the language used by PRC government officials.  Second, Hong 
Kong is seen as a bridge between international financial standards and 
PRC banking law.70  Third, training conducted by HKMA officials is 
viewed as more culturally similar to the PRC than training at other 
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve in the United States.  Because 
of China's experience with foreign powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
the PRC government is very sensitive to any perceived foreign influence 
over its policies.  In contrast to training conducted by the Federal 
Reserve or the Bank of England, since the PRC has always viewed Hong 
Kong as part of Mainland China, training by the HKMA does not raise an 
issue of foreign influence.  And finally, after the Hong Kong SAR 
became a part of the PRC, training programs could be held in Beijing or 
Shenzhen, allowing Chinese officials to attend lengthy training programs 
 
 
66 Secondment of PRC officials to HKMA does occur occasionally.  The 
secondments do not exceed six months in duration and are typically three to six months.  
See George Chen, China Central Bank, Bank Regulator Plan Staff Exchanges with 
HKMA, DOW JONES CHINESE FINANCIAL WIRE, Sept. 22, 2004. 
67 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 76 (2002). 
68 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 94 (2007).  While many senior PRC 
officials have participated in the HKMA training program, mid-level and junior officials 
have participated infrequently thus far. 
69 H.K. MONETARY AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 90-91 (2006). 
70 See Joseph C.K. Yam, The WTO: China's Future and Hong Kong's Opportunity, 
21 CATO J. 4 (2001) (discussing Hong Kong's role as a financial intermediary). 
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without obtaining a visa for travel. 
 Hong Kong is not the only source of training for Chinese bank 
regulatory officials, though it is the most prevalent.  Chinese officials 
also participate in supervisory training programs at the Federal Reserve 
Board in the United States, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Bank 
of England.  Exhibit C shows the attendance by PRC supervisory 
officials at a representative sample of training programs sponsored by 
bank supervisory agencies, including the HKMA.  This chart illustrates 
that the HKMA training programs reach a greater number of PRC 
officials than training conducted by other central banks and bank 
regulators. 
 The training conducted by the HKMA has led to ongoing informal 
discussions among supervisory officials at the HKMA and the CBRC.  
The HKMA has provided advice on workflow at the CBRC and the 
creation of the CBRC's offsite surveillance information system. 71   A 
technical dialogue between the agencies is also developing.  Under the 
terms of the Memorandum of Understanding between the CBRC and the 
HKMA, the Chairman of the CBRC and the Chief Executive of the 
HKMA meet formally twice each year.72  A recent consultation was held 
in September 2007 in Beijing.73  The Division Heads within the HKMA 
similarly talk with their counterparts at the CBRC, usually on a weekly 
basis.  The Executive Directors of the HKMA talk with their CBRC 
counterparts approximately twice per month.74 
 The CBRC has acknowledged the significance of the HKMA training 
for its staff.  In its 2006 Annual Report, the CBRC explains its 
enhancement of employee training illustrated by "[a] senior management 
training program in partnership with the [HKMA] . . . ."75  Again, in its 
2007 Annual Report, the CBRC acknowledged that "more than 600 
 
 
71 China Banking Regulatory Comm'n Press Release, supra note 59. 
72 Yam, supra note 48. 
73 See China Banking Regulatory Comm'n Press Release, The Eighth Consultation 
of the CBRC and the HKMA Was Held in Beijing (Sept. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=20070920F149D79D1D1
D1A0BFF815B60F7CC7E00 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (providing an account of a 
recent consultation between the CBRC and HKMA). 
74 See generally Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Organisation Structure, available 
at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/hkma/org_chart/org_chart.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 
2008) (showing executive directors two levels below the chief executive; division heads 
three levels below). 
75 CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 106 (2006). 
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persons participated in training jointly organized by the CBRC and 
overseas organizations, such as the HKMA, the FED [Federal Reserve], 
and the World Bank."76 
 As with the training of its officials, the CBRC also seeks high level 
advice from other bank regulators in the world; the HKMA officials are 
by no means their only source of advice.  The CBRC created its Council 
of International Advisors in order to gather advice on banking law and 
regulation, and on the reform of the PRC financial system. 77   The 
Council held its first meeting in November 2003, and held its latest 
meeting in June 2008.78 
 The PRC government is encouraging continued cooperation between 
PRC financial supervisory authorities and regulators outside the PRC, 
particularly those in Hong Kong.79  In a January 2007 speech before the 
National Financial Work Conference,80 Wen Jiabao, Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee Member and Premier of the State Council, 
stated that the PRC should "actively and steadily open up financial 
circles to the outside world."81  In addition, Premier Wen stated that the 
priorities for financial reform include working "to continue to advance 
financial co-operation between the Mainland and Hong Kong, . . . to 
further develop a mutual-assisting, complimentary and inter-active 
 
 
76 CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 88 (2007). 
77 See James Kynge, Beijing Calls in Foreign Bank Team, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 
2003, at 13 (discussing the formation of the Council of International Advisers, which 
included Sir Edward George, Gerry Corrigan, Andrew Crockett, David Carse, and 
Howard Davies – former heads of banks, financial services, and financial organizations in 
the US, UK, and internationally). 
78 See Press Release, China Banking Regulatory Comm'n, The CBRC Council of 
International Advisors Concluded its Sixth Meeting (June 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=20080618096A4ABD02B
32781FFA3B1937346FE00 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
79 The International Monetary Fund supports HKMA's discussion with the CBRC 
and its positive influence on banking law reform in the PRC.  See Nathan Porter et. al., 
People's Republic of China – Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:  Selected Issues, 
Int'l Monetary Fund Country Report No. 07/4, at 38 (Nov. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0704.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) 
(analyzing the importance of cooperation between the HKMA and financial regulators in 
mainland China). 
80 The National Financial Work Committee meets every five years.  Xinhua, China 
Begins Third National Finance Work Conference, BBC Monitoring International Insights, 
Jan. 19, 2007.  
81 China's Wen Jiabao on Need to Strengthen Financial Reform, BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacific, Jan. 21, 2007. 
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relationship between the two financial systems of the Mainland and 
Hong Kong . . . [and] to strengthen and promote the status and utility of 
Hong Kong as an international financial centre."82  Joseph Yam, Chief 
Executive of the HKMA, pointed out: 
[T]his is the first time the Central People's Government has been so 
specific about the relationship between the two financial systems.  And 
those are unambiguous words, at least in what they say about the spirit 
of the co-operative relationship.  Mutual assistance means that where 
the need arises to address shortcomings in the financial system, whether 
in supervision, regulation, standards, technology, or whatever, there 
should be a readiness on both sides to provide assistance.83 
 He went on to say, "[W]e in the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
spend a considerable amount of time providing assistance, in training and 
in technical support, to our counterpart regulators on the Mainland."84 
 The Chinese government has agreed that the Hong Kong banking 
industry provides valuable guidance to its PRC counterpart.  In a speech 
celebrating the tenth anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to the PRC, 
President Hu Jintao stated, “Hong Kong serves as an important window 
and bridge for China's economic, scientific, technological and cultural 
exchanges with the rest of the world.”85  While the cooperation between 
the HKMA and the CBRC may have started through the initiative of 
agency officials, the leadership of the PRC, the Hong Kong SAR and the 
financial services industry in Hong Kong are all encouraging the 
cooperation to continue. 
 In response to the Eleventh Five-Year Plan approved by the Tenth 
National People's Congress in early 2006 and in preparation for the 
January 2007 National Financial Work Conference meeting described 
above, the Hong Kong SAR government held an economic summit in the 
fall of 2006 inviting prominent leaders from business, academia, and the 
 
 
82 See Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the HKMA, Hong Kong – New Opportunities 
as an International Financial Centre, Address at a Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office 
Seminar, Tokyo (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/speeches/ 
speechs/joseph/20070508e1.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (setting out goals for the 
Hong Kong financial sector). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Hu Hails Hong Kong as 'Window and Bridge', CHINA DAILY, July 2, 2007, at 4 
(transcribing a speech in which President Hu praises Hong Kong's development) 
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legal profession to advise the government on an economic strategy for 
Hong Kong. 86   The Eleventh Five-Year Plan specifically called for 
improving financial sector supervision.87  One of the working groups, led 
by David Li, Chairman of the Bank of East Asia, focused on the financial 
sector.  This group recommended that "the Government should seek to 
work closely with the Mainland authority regarding the country's 
financial reform and reflect views on how Hong Kong can contribute to 
the country's financial reform and development as appropriate."88  The 
panel recommended a five-pronged strategy with the overall objective of 
making Hong Kong the global financial center within China on par with 
New York and London.  The panel "agreed that strengthening the 
cooperation between the regulatory bodies in Hong Kong and the 
Mainland was a prerequisite for the implementation of the . . . five-
pronged strategy."89 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION 
 Anne-Marie Slaughter focused on the democratic accountability of 
the global regulatory networks of which the HKMA-CBRC dialogue is, 
it is suggested here, an example.90  As part of her analysis, Slaughter 
created a useful typology of transnational regulatory networks, dividing 
them into three categories:  (1) networks formed within international 
organizations;91 (2) networks outside an international organization but 
"within a framework agreed on at least by the heads of their respective 
 
 
86 Press Release, Hong Kong SAR, Report by the Convenor of the Focus Group on 
Financial Services after the Economic Summit, (Sept. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200609/11/P200609110266.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2008). 
87 The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan: for National Economic & Social 
Development of the People's Republic of China, available at 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  See also 
Abstract of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Outline (Draft), People's Daily Online (Mar. 8 
2006), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/09/eng20060309_ 
249320.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
88 Report by the Convenor, supra note 86. 
89 CENT. POL'Y UNIT, supra note 65, at 4. 
90 See Slaughter, Global Government Networks, supra note 5, at 1042-43 (proposing 
a "transgovernmental regulatory network" where officials from different governments 
cooperate to address shared problems). 
91 Id. at 1049-50.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is 
an example. 
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governments",92 and (3) spontaneous government networks.93  This third 
category is further divided into two subgroups:  (a) networks that become 
transgovernmental regulatory organizations and (b) networks formed by 
agreements (typically memoranda of agreements) between two domestic 
regulatory organizations.94  The relationship between the HKMA and the 
CBRC originally began within this third category–a spontaneous 
governmental network formed by a memorandum of agreement.  The 
statements by PRC leaders President Hu and Premier Wen and by the 
Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR Donald Tsang indicate that the 
heads of state have approved this relationship and this network has 
moved to the second category in Slaughter's typology–a network outside 
an international organization but approved by heads of state. 
 While Slaughter's concern regarding the democratic accountability 
regarding these networks is important, an analysis of the lack of 
democracy in the PRC and Hong Kong is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 95   Rather, the pertinent question is how or whether this 
transnational regulatory network developing between financial 
supervisory officials in the PRC and Hong Kong, particularly the CBRC 
and the HKMA, will continue in the future.  The growth in the number of 
HKMA training programs cannot continue at its current rate without 
additional resources.  The HKMA is approaching its capacity to provide 
this training.  As of January 1, 2008, the HKMA had 638 total staff.96  
The CBRC had 23, 269 employees at the end of 2006,97 and the PBOC as 
of December 31, 2007 employed 137,375 staff. 98   The number of 
employees in the CBRC and the PBOC dwarfs the number of the HKMA 
 
 
92 Id. at 1051. 
93 Id. at 1051-52.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an example. 
94 Id. 
95 The PRC is a one party system controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.  The 
Hong Kong Legislative Council is not elected by universal suffrage.  A majority of the 
council is elected by particular constituencies (such as business and the professions).  
Basic Law, supra note 1, Art. 68 and Annex II.  The Chief Executive is not elected by 
universal suffrage, but rather by a committee of approximately 800 electors.  Basic Law, 
supra note 1, Art. 45 and Annex I.  Even if these interactions between the CBRC and the 
HKMA were approved by the respective governments, the approval would not address 
the democratic accountability concerns highlighted by Slaughter because the 
governments are not democratic. 
96 H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 108 (2007). 
97 See CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 39, at 104. 
98  PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 80 (2007).  This figure includes 
22,076 employees of China Banknote Printing and Minting Co. Ltd. and its subsidiaries. 
52 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3: 1 
 
employees, many of whom are not involved in these training programs.  
Without additional resources, the HKMA will likely not be able to train 
more than the approximately 1,400 PRC officials who have participated 
in the last two years.  To maintain its influence through training, the 
HKMA will need to locate additional resources, partner with another 
institution in Hong Kong, or seek collaboration with a bank supervisor in 
another country. 
 As a policy matter, the PRC and Hong Kong governments clearly 
support continued cooperation between these officials, or at least their 
public statements support this cooperation.  The PRC wishes to reform 
its inefficient banking system and limit the future growth of non-
performing loans.  Hong Kong desires to become the international 
financial center in China, on par with New York and London, and has 
determined that becoming even more integrated with the Chinese 
economy is necessary to reach that goal.  Continued regulatory 
cooperation between the HKMA and the CBRC would appear to aid each 
agency in accomplishing its respective policy objectives.  After five 
years of training PRC bank regulators (and since 2005, having had over 
1,100 PRC officials participate each year), further research is needed to 
determine the actual effect of this training on the implementation of 
banking law in the PRC.  The regulatory exchange and cooperation 
described in this Article yields the somewhat surprising conclusion that 
small Hong Kong could potentially have a significant influence on the 
implementation of bank reform in China. 
 





ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONS:  PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
Big Four Banks Asset Management Corporation 
Bank of China Orient Asset Management 
Agricultural Bank of China Great Wall Asset Management 
China Construction Bank Cinda Asset Management 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Huarong Asset Management 
 
Source:  Guonon Ma & Ben S.C. Fung, China's Asset Management Corporations 1 (Bank 
for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 115, 2002). 




HONG KONG SAR AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF  
CHINA BANKING LAWS COMPARED 
 
Topic Hong Kong SAR PRC 
Anti-money 
laundering 
HKMA Guideline 3.3 
Supplement to the Guideline on 
Prevention of Money 
Laundering 
Measures on the Administration of 
Large Transactions and Suspicious 
Transaction Reports of Financial 
Institutions, Order No. 2 of PBOC, 
promulgated Nov. 14, 2006;  
Provisions on Anti-money 
Laundering in Financial Institutions, 
promulgated Jan. 3, 2003, PBOC 
Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate Governance of 
Locally Incorporated 
Authorized Institutions, HKMA 
Supervisory Policy Manual, 
CG-1 
Guidance on Independent Directors 
and External Supervisors of Joint-
Stock Commercial Banks, 
promulgated Apr. 6, 2006; Guidance 
on Corporate Governance of Joint 
Stock Commercial Banks; Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance Reforms 
and Supervision of Bank of China 




Credit Derivatives, HKMA 
Supervisory Policy Manual, 
CR-G-12 
Notice of the CBRC on Issuing Risk 
Reminder for the Derivatives Trading 
of Chinese-Invested Banks, 
promulgated Mar. 22, 2005; 
Provisional Administrative Rules 
Governing Derivatives Activities of 




Personal Data (Privacy) 
Ordinance, Cap. 486; The 
Sharing and Use of Consumer 
Credit Data through a Credit 
Reference Agency, HKMA 
Supervisory Policy Manual, IC-
6 
Provisional Rules on Management of 
Individual Credit Information 




 99 The Hong Kong Monetary Authority created a commercial credit reference agency 
in 2004.  In the prior year the credit reference agency for consumers was enhanced to 
protect consumer confidentiality.  One significant limitation in the development of retail 
financial markets in China is the lack of a reliable source of individual credit histories.  
The People's Bank of China in 2005 began to create a credit bureau for consumers.  This 
pilot project has been limited to selected major cities in China thus far. 
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Topic Hong Kong SAR PRC 
Foreign Bank 
Subsidiaries 
Establishment of Overseas 
Banking Subsidiaries:  §51A, 
HKMA Supervisory Manual, 
CG-4  
Guidance on Supervision of Overseas 
Institutions of Commercial Banks, 
promulgated Aug. 20, 2001 by 
PBOC; Rules Governing the 
Consolidated Supervision of Foreign 




Guideline 5.7 Loan 
Classification System; 
Guideline 5.7.1 Loan 
Classification system (loans to 
be reported as "Special 
Mention");  
CBRC Guidelines on Risk-Based 
Loan Classification, promulgated 
Dec. 24, 2000; CBRC Provisional 
Measures on Monitoring and 
Examination of Bad Assets of 
Commercial Banks, promulgated 
Mar. 25, 2004  
Capital 
Adequacy101 
Banking Ordinance Chap. 155, 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(superseded);  Maintenance of 
Adequate Capital against 
Market Risk, HKMA 
Supervisory Manual, CA-G-2  
Regulation Governing Capital 
Adequacy of Commercial Banks, 
CBRC, Feb. 27, 2004 
Connected 
Lending 
Connected Lending, HKMA 
Supervisory Manual, CR-G-9; 
Large Exposures and Risk 
Concentrations, CR-G-8  
Guidelines of Risk Management of 
Granting Credits to Group Clients by 
Commercial Banks, promulgated 
Oct. 23, 2003, CBRC 
 
 
 100 China traditionally used four categories to classify loans in banks.  The four 
categories included "normal", "overdue", "doubtful", and "bad".  More developed 
banking systems have moved to a five category system of classifying loans.  These five 
categories are normal, special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss.  Loans classified 
as substandard, doubtful, or loss are considered non-performing loans.  Hong Kong 
adopted the five category classification standard in 1994 and stated one reason for the 
adoption was that the United States, Australia and other nations had adopted the five 
category classification which was thus becoming the international standard.  H.K. 
Monetary Auth., Loan Classification System Policy Paper, ¶ 2.3 (Sept. 1994), available 
at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/guide/doc/word/g05_7_a.doc (last visited Oct. 20, 
2008). 
 101 Hong Kong was an early adopter of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord.  Under the 
1988 Accord, banks must maintain capital equal to 8% of the risk-weighted value of the 
bank's assets.  In March 2004, the China Banking Regulatory Commission adopted 
regulations implementing the 1988 Basel Accord.  The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
began implementing the Basel II capital adequacy accord in 2007.  The CBRC has 
concluded that the Basel II Accord is not appropriate for the People's Republic of China 
until 2010 at the earliest.  Chinese Banks Overhauled, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 20, 2005. 
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Topic Hong Kong SAR PRC 
Electronic 
Banking 
Supervision of E-banking, 
HKMA Supervisory Manual 
TM-E-1; Regulation of 
Advertising Material for 
Deposits Issued Over the 
Internet, HKMA Supervisory 
Manual TM-E-2;  HKMA 
Guideline No. 15.1 Electronic 
Banking; Security of Banking 
Transactions Over the Internet, 
Circular, Nov. 25, 1997; 
Management of Security Risks 
in Electronic Banking Services, 
Circular 2000; Independent 
Assessment of Security Aspects 
of Transactional E-Banking 
Services, HKMA Guidance 
Note,  
Notification of the PBOC on 
Carrying Out the Relevant Provisions 
of the Interim Measures on the 
Administration of Online Banking 
Businesses, promulgated Apr. 23, 
2003; Directives to E-bank Safety 
Assessment, Jan. 26, 2006, CBRC 
Deposit 
Insurance102 
Deposit Protection Scheme 





Unregulated  Law of the People's Bank of China 
on Banking Regulation and 
Supervision, adopted Dec. 27, 2003; 
Decree of CBRC, Decree of 
National Development and Reform 




 102 The Hong Kong SAR did not provide a deposit protection scheme for consumers 
until 2006.  In May 2004, the Hong Kong Legislative Council adopted the Deposit 
Protection Ordinance.  Under this legislation, depositors are protected up to 
HK$ 100,000.00 per depositor per bank in the event of a bank failure.  This scheme was 
implemented in 2006.  In contrast, the PRC does not yet offer a deposit insurance 
program.  In 2006, internal drafts of regulations creating a deposit insurance scheme in 
the PRC were being circulated.  Deposit Insurance System Planned, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 13, 
2005.  The proposed Chinese regulations were inspired by the deposit protection schemes 
in other nations, including the United States and, to a lesser degree, Hong Kong. 
 103 Prior to 1994 interest rates charged by Hong Kong banks were regulated by a 
cartel, the Hong Kong Association of Banks.  From the late 1990's until 2004, the range 
of interest rates charged by banks was broadened by this cartel.  Beginning in January 
2004, no interest rate regulations were applicable to banks in Hong Kong.  In contrast, the 
People's Bank of China continues to regulate interest rates for deposits and loans.  The 
interest rates allowed on loans are artificially low resulting in negative real interest rates.  
In 2004 the People's Bank of China liberalized interest rates by setting a minimum floor 
for interest rates on loans but no upper limit.  The interest rates paid on deposit accounts 
cannot exceed the benchmark rate set by the People's Bank of China, but there is no 
minimum floor. 
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Sources:  Hong Kong Monetary Authority Annual Report; Reserve Bank of Australia 
Annual Report; International Monetary Fund Annual Report; Bank of England Centre for 
Central Banking Studies Annual Report. 
 
* The IMF and the Federal Reserve do not report the nationality of trainees in their 
annual reports. 
 
 
